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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the idea that distributive justice in the multilateral trade 
regime is best served, at the moment, by democratizing its governance procedures.  
 
Part I of this paper focuses on the explanatory question – from a trade and 
development perspective, how can we understand the breakdown in Doha negotiations?  
This paper draws attention to institutional dynamics exacerbating the current stalemate.   
In answering that question, Part I draws from two disparate methodological traditions, 
which can be described as “economistic” and “constructivist.”  Constructivist analysis 
suggests a focus on the discursive subtexts that constitute the identity and interests of 
participating states.  With that focus, it becomes clear that a variety of discursive 
contradictions have intensified over recent years, deeply destabilizing the WTO as a 
context for deliberation and political resolution.  Economistic analysis, as applied here, 
focuses on the transaction costs confronting institutional coordination.   
 
Beyond the explanatory perspective, however, some normative inquiry into the 
basis for a proceduralist approach is desirable, especially when illustrious recent 
applications of moral theory to distributive justice have called for the institutionalization 
of strong substantive principles.  Part II will consider two substantive arguments for 
distributive justice, in the context of the multilateral trade regime:  Frank Garcia’s 
argument for S&D as a Rawlsian application of the “international difference principle”; 
and Carol Gould’s call for human rights, and especially social and economic rights, as a 
basis for grounding global economic justice.   
 
Part III studies emerging “equality jurisprudence” in the GATT/WTO.  The 
“legalization” of the trade regime has resulted in the adoption of an equality, or non-
discrimination, doctrinal foundation for the judicialized decision-making of the dispute 
settlement wing of the WTO, over and above the “reciprocity” model that characterizes 
WTO negotiations.     
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  Comments welcome at chantal-thomas@lawschool.cornell.edu.   
My sincere thanks to Professors Carmody, Garcia and Linarelli for their kind invitation, and to the 
American Society of International Law for hosting this conference.   
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Introduction: Democratic governance as proceduralist distributive justice 
 
This paper explores the idea that distributive justice in the multilateral trade 
regime is best served, at the moment, by democratizing its governance procedures.  
 
This idea of a proceduralist theory of distributive justice is both normative and 
explanatory.  The complexity of trade policy, especially in relationship to economic 
development, problematizes an agenda of “constitutionalization” – whether the 
substantive principles at issue are conventional GATT/WTO disciplines, Special and 
Differential Treatment (S&D) or social and economic rights.  The complexity of trade 
policy and the still attenuated legitimacy of the multilateral regime also help to explain 
why the WTO is now in the very process of attempting to democratize governance 
amongst Members – and why that process has been so fraught with difficulty.  A 
proceduralist theory of distributive justice allows for a focus on the basic legitimacy of 
the regime.   
 
The WTO has run, for most of its history, according to a “club model” in which 
important policies and decisions were dictated by the powerful elite of participating 
states.1  The limitations of the club model, and the challenges it posed to the WTO’s 
legitimacy, came to light during the “Battle in Seattle” during the WTO’s 1999 
Ministerial Conference.2  Since Seattle, the WTO has struggled to find new ways of 
including developing-country government participation. 
 
Yet it hardly needs to be stated that chronic stagnation and stalemate in WTO 
negotiations, from precisely Seattle onwards, have severely challenged the multilateral 
trading regime.  Moreover, the increase in developing-country government participation 
has not resulted in clear policy shifts in line with “S&D.”  Rather, the results have been 
mixed.  In some cases, such as intellectual property, important gains such as the WTO 
decisions on public health and access to medicines have been made.  In other cases, such 
as agricultural negotiations, no clear reform has emerged. 
 
One challenge is to elucidate the reasons for those difficulties.  Obviously, the 
number of participating governments, and the complexity and political sensitivity of the 
issues at hand, are all central reasons for the stalemate.  WTO membership now exceeds 
many times over the small group of fewer than 30 governments who participated in the 
GATT’s inception.  Moreover, the WTO now seeks to tackle issues, such as agriculture 
and services, far beyond the GATT’s traditional range.  Political resistance to trade 
                                                 
1 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of 
Democratic Legitimacy, in Efficiency, Equity, Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the 
Millennium (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
2 Cf. Lori Wallach and Michelle Sforza, Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and the 
Erosion of Democracy (1999) (published by Public Citizen), 138. 
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concessions, unsurprisingly, has intensified accordingly. 
 
Such immediately apparent constraints do not exhaust the inquiry, however.  Part 
I of this paper focuses on the explanatory question – from a trade and development 
perspective, how can we understand the breakdown in Doha negotiations?  This paper 
draws attention to institutional dynamics exacerbating the current stalemate.   
  
In answering that question, Part I draws from two disparate methodological 
traditions, which can be described as “economistic” and “constructivist.”  Constructivist 
analysis suggests a focus on the discursive subtexts that constitute the identity and 
interests of participating states.  With that focus, it becomes clear that a variety of 
discursive contradictions have intensified over recent years, deeply destabilizing the 
WTO as a context for deliberation and political resolution.  Economistic analysis, as 
applied here, focuses on the transaction costs confronting institutional coordination.  
Drawing attention to recent examples in negotiations on intellectual property and 
agricultural trade, this analysis helps to show why differentiation amongst developing 
countries has become such a challenge to reaching resolution in negotiations. 
 
Beyond the explanatory perspective, however, some normative inquiry into the 
basis for a proceduralist approach is desirable, especially when illustrious recent 
applications of moral theory to distributive justice have called for the institutionalization 
of strong substantive principles.  Professor Frank Garcia’s argument for S&D as a 
Rawlsian application of the “international difference principle” provides an important 
example.  Another important intervention has come from Professor Carol Gould’s call for 
human rights, and especially social and economic rights, as a basis for grounding global 
economic justice.   
 
Part II will consider these substantive arguments for distributive justice, in the 
context of the multilateral trade regime.  Here, the paper examines the Rawlsian analysis 
in Garcia’s account and suggests an alternative reading of Rawls on distributive justice.  
Essentially, the argument is that far less is understood about trade and development 
policy than about those “core” political or economic entitlements that would form part of 
Rawls’s just society.  Consequently, harm would arise were any particular set of trade 
policies – whether special and differential treatment, or conventional “mainstream” WTO 
rules – to be converted to rights.   
 
Even if social and economic rights were to be adopted as a substantive framework 
for applying international economic law in the trade regime, their indeterminacy would 
eventually require a return to democratic deliberation in order to elucidate specific 
applications.  In considering Gould’s call for social and economic rights, this paper 
suggests that, at least in the GATT/WTO context, proceduralism should be morally 
predicate to rights in articulating global distributive justice.   
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The indeterminacy analysis carries over into a study of emerging “equality 
jurisprudence” in the GATT/WTO, considered in Part III.  The “legalization” of the trade 
regime has resulted in the adoption of an equality, or non-discrimination, doctrinal 
foundation for the judicialized decision-making of the dispute settlement wing of the 
WTO, over and above the “reciprocity” model that characterizes WTO negotiations.  The 
embrace of “substantive equality” in this context, however, has not yielded the policy 
gains anticipated by developing-country governments.  The unlikelihood of sustainably 
impressing developing-country views on WTO jurisprudence through the dispute 
settlement process makes understanding the reasons for the current breakdowns of the 
Doha Development Round all the more important. 
 
 
Part I: Why aren’t the relatively democratized current negotiations in the WTO 
working? 
 
Few today would dispute the premise, once controversial amongst scholars of 
international relations, that states will often seek to coordinate their behavior and interests 
through institutions and that, consequently, international institutions can be analyzed as 
mechanisms for cooperation.  Global governance studies rest precisely on this 
foundational maxim.3 
 
The WTO exemplifies the institutionalist claim – it represents a massive effort to 
coordinate state behavior on economic policy.  Moreover, the mechanism for 
coordination has progressed from the traditional “green room” model in which the 
powerful Northern countries cut the deal for everybody else, to a more inclusive approach 
in recent years. 
 
The perception of legitimacy arises not only from moral discourse, but from frank 
assessments of institutional efficacy.  From Weber onward, institutional legitimacy has 
been identified as a key aspect of institutional functionality.4  In other words, legitimacy 
forms the ground on which an institution operates.   
 
If  globalization inheres in “the intensification of social relations which link 
distant bodies in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many 
miles away and vice versa,”5 according to “one of the most influential definitions of 
globalization in the literature on the subject,”6 then the basis for concerns about 
legitimacy become clear.  The more abstract or remote the institution, the more 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Introduction, in Governance in a Globalizing World 
(Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue eds., 2000), 19.  
4 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Am. J. Int'l L. (1988), 705, 709. 
5 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (1990), 64. 
6 Justin Rosenberg, The Follies of Globalization Theory (2000), 118. 
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attenuated the basis for trust in it – what Giddens calls “ontological security.”7  Thus, if 
private international economic law (lex mercatoria) features a paradoxical proliferation 
of legal normativity and validity without institutions,8 public international economic law 
in the WTO may arguable feature the precise converse: highly salient institutions without 
a corresponding perception of valid legal normativity. 
 
This observation points to a methodological directive.  If perceptions of 
legitimacy affect institutional effectiveness, then social analysis which can identify the 
sources of, or obstacles to, institutional legitimacy becomes very useful.  Social 
perceptions of institutions, in this sense, directly affect their authoritativeness.  If social 
perceptions are a form of “shared knowledge,” then institutional structures are channels 
for and manifestations of the distribution of social knowledge and ideas.9 
 
A. The social construction of state identity and interests 
 
Against the traditional dichotomy in international relations of idealism and 
interest-based realism, constructivist analysis holds that ideas are not opposed to, but 
rather constitutive of, power and interest in determination of state and interstate 
behavior.10  Recalling Weber’s classic formulation that “ideas have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest,"11 
constructivism looks for how institutional function rests partially on how power and 
interest within that institution are conceived.   
 
A constructivist analysis of challenges to democratic governance in the WTO 
would consequently look into the discursive construction of the institution’s goals and 
actors.  A passage in Alexander Wendt’s canonical Social Theory of International 
Politics  offers a useful starting point: 
 
When Neorealists offer multipoliarity as an explanation for 
war, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute 
the poles as enemies rather than friends.  When Liberals 
offer economic interdependence as an explanation for 
peace, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute 
states with identities that care about free trade and 
economic growth.12 
                                                 
7 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (1990), 92-113. 
8 Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in Gunther Teubner ed., 
Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth 1997), 3, 15. 
9  Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999), 20. 
10 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999), 135. 
11 Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, in M. Weber, H. Gerth, & C. W. Mills eds., From Max Weber (Oxford 
University Press edition, 1958), 280. 
12 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999), 135. 
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What follows is an exposition of the ways in which the current context for international 
economic law strays from the “liberal” vision in which states are “friends” who “care 
about free trade.”  Instead, contradictions abound, both within the WTO and in the 
international environment more generally, that destabilize these cornerstones of 
institutional culture.   
   
Discursive Contradictions Posed by Developed-Country Mercantilism.  First, the 
embrace of free trade remains deeply assaulted by the protectionism of developed-
country governments on issues of domestic or strategic importance, such as agriculture.  
From tariff peaks limiting imports, to subsidies promoting exports, developed-country 
practices on agricultural protection fly in the face of WTO norms and indeed constitute 
textbook examples of mercantilist trade policy.  While virtually all governments act 
inconsistently in trade policy, and especially on this issue, the contradictions are 
particularly glaring from the leading founders of the GATT/WTO, and those 
contradictions have managed to survive decades after that founding. 
 
Such contradictions are felt even more strongly where agricultural trade 
liberalization in developing countries comparatively outdoes that in developed countries, 
due to promotion through regional or bilateral trade agreements (as in the case of NAFTA 
and Mexico) or through structural adjustment advised by international financial 
institutions (as in the case of the IMF and Jamaica).  The sheer volume of involved trade 
magnifies the impact of this contradiction. 
 
Secondly, beyond the surface contradiction, developed-country mercantilism 
destabilizes the core normative commitment of the WTO to comparative advantage.  The 
principle of comparative advantage in any case ranks among the more counterintuitive in 
economics because it counsels governments that domestic social gain will result from 
increasing the presence of foreign competitors.   
 
Governments who truly commit to comparative advantage should presumably be 
content with unilateral trade liberalization.  Yet GATT/WTO trade negotiations have 
always insisted on reciprocity, and even imbued the concept of reciprocity with quasi-
moral overtones.   
 
The behavior of developed-country states therefore calls into question the validity 
of their own “identities” as “states… that care about free trade” according to Wendt’s 
definition above.  The centrality of reciprocity and the existence of massive and long-
term “carveouts” generate powerful countervailing signals.   
 
These mixed signals necessarily must undermine the “ontological security” that 
can be attributed to the GATT/WTO regime.  Instead they convey a great deal of 
ambivalence by the leading states about the validity of the presuppositions that support 
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the WTO.  Such ambivalence must in turn affect the willingness of developing-country 
states to embrace identities that “care about free trade.”  The legitimacy of the WTO as 
an institutional system must struggle with this widespread evidence of mercantilism in 
the form of efforts to game negotiations so that import liberalization is minimized and 
export supports are maximized.  In short the goals of the system are constantly thrown 
into question, destabilizing the ground for institutional advancement and legitimacy. 
 
Discursive Contradictions Posed by National Security and Border Measures.  
Wendt’s formulation contrasts a war relationship, in which hostile states are constructed 
as enemies rather than friends, with a peacetime economic relationship in which states are 
implicitly constructed as friends rather than enemies. Yet this construction, too, is 
powerfully contradicted by mixed signals generated by developed country states.   
 
Particularly post-9/11, international affairs have become heavily influenced by a 
“friend-enemy” distinction13 that ranges from Samuel Huntington’s explicit “clash of 
civilizations”14 to the somewhat more subtle distinction by liberal international relations 
theory between democratic and non-democratic states.15 
 
The friend-enemy distinction as a basis for action also directly contradicts the 
implicit constraints on sovereignty and emphasis on international rule of law that are 
signified by multilateral institutions.  If state action is determined by the identification of 
friends or enemies, then this determination becomes the basis for sovereignty and 
necessitates the capacity to contradict or disobey established principle.16 
 
The rise of biopower and border control in the global North underscore the 
centrality of this friend-enemy distinction17 in shaping the perception of the global South 
as a source of threat rather than a friendly co-participant in economic interdependence.  
“Fortress Europe,” the increasingly enthusiastic use by US immigration authorities of 
bioinformatics, the steadily growing difficulty that nationals from the global South face 
in procuring travel or business visas to the global North – all these create a context that, 
while certainly not on the table at WTO negotiations, must necessarily form part of the 
background.  That background reveals a dichotomy between “open markets” and “closed 
borders” that belies a destabilizing absence of trust.18 
 
“The daily life of international politics is an on-going process of states taking 
identities in relation to Others, casting them into corresponding counter-identities, and 
                                                 
13 Tracy B. Strong, Foreword, Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (2005), xx. 
14 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1998). 
15 E.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 
International Organization (Autumn 1997). 
16 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (2005). 
17 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (trans. Kevin Attell, 2005), 3-4. 
18 Peter Andreas, U.S.–Mexico: Open Markets, Closed Borders, FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1996, at 51. 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
forthcoming in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 9
playing out the result.”19  If perceived gains from trade with those “others” are heavily 
counterbalanced by concerns about sovereignty and security from external threat, then the 
viable constitution of power and interest within a model of interdependence that could 
provide the heavy support for difficult, protracted and complex negotiations is limited.20 
 
Discursive Contradictions and Challenges for Legitimation through Deliberation.  
If shared deliberation is to form a central basis for legitimacy, then discourse must also be 
shared.21   The argument presented above is that these subtexts undermine the implicit 
assumptions that must support trade negotiations, namely that there is some tolerable 
level of friendliness and commitment to free trade across state participants.  They inhibit 
the fostering of “ontological security” necessary to form shared vocabularies.   
 
Accordingly, if this constructivist analysis is correct, there will have to be some 
transformation in the way in which state identities and interests are constructed in the 
present environment.  It may not be possible, however, to overcome the countervailing 
forces of mercantilism and national security.  
 
B.  Transaction costs in institutional coordination 
 
Even if it were possible to overcome the countervailing forces of mercantilism 
and national security in order to stabilize the WTO’s basic institutional environment, an 
additional set of institutional challenges would arise for developing-country governments 
in particular in the coordination of policy interest. 
 
Joel Trachtman has offered the most succinct and productive framework for 
economic analysis of international law.22  Applying insights from institutional economics, 
Trachtman has demonstrated how international lawmaking can be understood by focusing 
on transaction costs that freight the negotiation of rights and obligations.23   
 
                                                 
19 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999), 20. 
20 “The free movement of people, ideas – and merchandise, of course – is important and has contributed 
enormously to the positive change in the recent decade.  But if that outside world also, to many, is seen as a 
threat, the political forces are fishing in murky waters and looking at migration and crime and so forth 
coming from that dangerous outside, then we are in trouble.” H.E. Jan Eliasson, The Progress of UN 
Reform, Speech to Carnegie Council, June 7, 2006 (as part of “A Fairer Globalization” series) (emphasis 
added). 
21 Jürgen Habermas, Between Fact and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (William Rehg trams., 1996), 299, 300 (“democratic will-formation has the exclusive function 
of legitimating the exercise of political power. . . . the procedures and communicative presuppositions of 
democratic opinion- and will-formation function as the most important sluices for . . . discursive 
rationalization” and institutional legitimation). 
22 Joel Trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (2008). 
23 See Joel Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 Virginia Journal of International 
Law (2001), 1, 51 (stating that rules cost more to develop than standards); see also Joel Trachtman, The 
Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harvard International Law Journal (1999), 333, 350-56. 
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With Trachtman’s perspective in mind, generic categories of transaction costs that 
would affect multilateral trade negotiations include information costs (the effect that gaps 
in information and capacity have in producing suboptimal rules), specification costs (the 
time and effort required to bring all parties to agreement about specific language); 
strategic holdout costs (the risk that some negotiating states will act opportunistically to 
refrain from providing their anticipated consent, in order to wring additional concessions 
from counterparties anxious to gain closure); “ordering” costs (skewing of negotiations 
that reflect the order in which preferences are expressed);24 and capture (costs resulting 
from “suboptimal” rules that skew to a particular set of interests within the negotiating 
state’s territory, thereby skewing overall negotiations).   
 
Coordination Challenges in WTO Negotiations by Developing-Country 
Governments.  The general coordination difficulties described in the preceding paragraph 
must be considered in tandem with more specific sources of developing-country 
governments’ collective action problems in  WTO negotiations.  Two such challenges 
can be immediately recognized.  First, the number of developing-country participants has 
increased vastly over time, magnifying associated coordination gains.  Secondly, crucial 
challenges to capacity-building remain, which have been extensively described in trade 
law and policy literature.25 
 
Two additional challenges will be mentioned here: firstly, economic 
differentiation amongst developing countries, and secondly, the rise of parallel regional 
and bilateral tracks for trade negotiations. 
 
 Economic differentiation amongst developing countries.  The differences in 
income level and quality of life amongst “developing countries” has, for example, 
resulted in differentiations in statistical publications such as the UN Human Development 
Index between “high human development” (Mexico, Mauritius), “medium human 
development” (Grenada, Guyana), and “low human development” (Nigeria, Nepal).26 
 
 Such differentiations can affect trade negotiations.  For example, on the question 
of whether S & D should be accorded equally to all developing countries, or instead 
accorded on a sliding scale, governments may well differ based on where their economies 
would rank in such a calculus.  In the WTO agriculture negotiations, talks over the 
parameters of the “Development Box” have featured proposals for a more relaxed, open-
ended S&D provision that would not draw distinctions based on level or type of 
                                                 
24 Cf. Kenneth Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 Journal of Political Economy 
(1950), 328–346.  Arrow’s impossibility theorem proves this to be true even without the assumption of 
structural bias in the ranking and order of recognition of country preferences which would apply in the 
WTO developed country-vs-developing country context. 
25 See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Can WTO Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Serve Developing 
Countries?” 23 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2006), 643-686. 
26 UN Human Development Report, Human Development Index (2007/2008). 
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development.  Others have proposed additional protections for least developed countries, 
or for countries deemed to be particularly vulnerable for one reason or another to 
liberalized agricultural trade.   
 
“Holding the line” to a particular position would be difficult amongst such a range 
of concerns.  The difficulty in maintaining a collective line becomes further pronounced 
as WTO trade negotiations proceed on any given issue, even in the more inclusive post-
Seattle formats.  This is because developing country coalitions will typically rely, for 
efficiency’s sake, on “core” countries to represent the coalition’s position.  The larger 
developing economies tend to prevail in such streamlined negotiations.  In the spectrum 
from the old “club model” to a one-state, one-vote model, this scenario amounts to a 
slightly more inclusive club: 
 
The proliferation of coalition representation in the green 
room has improved some aspects of the internal 
transparency of WTO decision-making, but far from all. 
Indeed, since the conclusion of the July Package in 2004 
much of the focus of consensus-building has shifted to 
small group discussions between the G-6 (EU, US, Japan, 
Australia, India and Brazil) and the G-4 (EU, US, India and 
Brazil), excluding the vast majority of developing countries 
and their coalitions. These developments seem to affirm . . . 
earlier claims that the key challenge for WTO decision-
making will continue to centre on an ‘insider-outsider’ 
divide, rather than a ‘North-South’ divide, whereby only a 
handful of developed and major developing countries are 
included in key deliberations.27 
 
 Such differentiation takes on additional complexity based on the specific 
coalitions that form across or even within sectors.  Again taking agricultural negotiations 
as an example, small island developing states in the WTO have articulated a collective 
position emphasizing preferential, non-reciprocal tariffs for developing countries over 
generalized market liberalization.  This emphasis stems from the reliance of many small 
island developing economies on GSP trade preference schemes and the like.28  In this 
                                                 
27 Mayur Patel, New Faces in the Green Room, Global Trade Governance Project, GEG Working Paper 
(2007), 19 (available at: http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org) (internal citations omitted).  
28 World Trade Organization, WTO Agriculture negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now (2004), 
61-62.:   
 
Many developing countries complain that their exports still face high 
tariffs and other barriers in developed countries’ markets and that their 
attempts to develop processing industries are hampered by tariff 
escalation (higher import duties on processed products compared to raw 
materials). They want to see substantial cuts in these barriers.  
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respect, the position on S&D articulated by the CARICOM countries29 (small island 
developing states) contradicts, for example, that of the larger developing economies that 
participate in the Cairns Group, a coalition that spans the developed-developing country 
divide.30 
 
 Parallel Tracks for Trade Negotiations.  The rise of regional and bilateral trade 
agreements has become a widely observed phenomenon, e.g. “124 bilateral and regional 
trade agreements were concluded in the 48-year GATT regime and 196 bilateral and 
regional trade agreements have been concluded since during the first eleven years of the 
WTO regime... Nearly 40 percent of total global trade now takes place under bilateral and 
regional trade agreements.”31   
 
The difficulty that such parallel tracks would pose for collective action is 
manifest.  Any preexisting imbalance in power that could be corrected through collective 
action in a multilateral setting may be exacerbated in a bilateral or regional context.32   
 
Intellectual property negotiations provide a good example of this dynamic.  In the 
WTO context, developing country governments, led by the African Group coalition, were 
able to achieve a clarification of TRIPs that supports a more relaxed and open-ended 
interpretation of its compulsory licensing provisions. These negotiation efforts resulted in 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health – one of the few concrete outcomes of 
the Doha Round – and a further clarification of in the WTO General Council’s 2003 
decision on “paragraph 6” of the Doha Declaration.33  By contrast, bilateral and regional 
trade agreements between developed and developing countries often feature “TRIPs 
Plus” provisions that are more restrictive than those found in the WTO regime.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
On the other hand, some smaller developing countries have expressed 
concerns about import barriers in developed countries falling too fast. 
They say they depend on a few basic commodities that currently need 
preferential treatment (such as duty-free trade) in order to preserve the 
value of their access to richer countries’ markets. If normal tariffs fall 
too fast, their preferential treatment is eroded, they say. 
 
29 CARICOM proposal, WT/G/AG/NG/W/100.  The CARICOM countries are Antigua and Barbuda, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname. 
30 The Cairns Group has had 19 members since 2006: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.  See the Cairns Group proposals in WT documents G/AG/NG/W/11, 35, 
and 93. 
31  Larry Crump, Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System, 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law (2006), 487. 
32 Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 Virginia Journal of International Law (1997), 639. 
33 Larry Crump, Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System, 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law (2006) 487, 504. 
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The TRIPs-plus example also indicates that fragmentation need not be the only 
consequence of collective action problems manifest in bilateral and regional trade 
agreements.  Indeed, harmonization might be a result of “carving off” individual or 
groups of developing countries – a dynamic that some have also observed with respect to 
investor protection clauses in bilateral investment treaties.34 
 
Coordination Problems and Consequences for S &D.  The above section 
demonstrates that opening up WTO decision-making to more democratic processes will 
not bring necessarily bring about a clear shift in the direction of a particular approach to 
development policy, or the S & D principle.  Various institutional costs to coordination 
stem from generic transaction costs to differentiation amongst developing-country 
interests to coordination across multi-track trade negotiations.  These costs mean that, 
even if developing country governments were to gain a clear majoritarian position in 
WTO governance, complexity in policy decisions on trade and development would 
continue.   
 
This complexity, however, is precisely why a proceduralist account nevertheless 
remains necessary.  In the absence of universal policy directives, an open-ended dialogue 
may allow for the greatest possible consideration of disparate views and varied sources of 
information.  Although a democratized negotiation procedure in the WTO may be far 
from ideal, it may nevertheless provide the surest path to decisions which reflect some 
semblance of distributive justice for developing countries.  The next section considers the 
normative arguments for a “rights-based” approach to distributive justice in the 
international economic law context, and seeks to demonstrate why those pathways may 
ultimately still lead us to proceduralism.
                                                 
34 Larry Crump, Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System, 9 Journal of International 
Economic Law (2006), 644-655 (describing the reemergence of the Hull rule in BITs).  But see United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (2000) 
(UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2) (finding enormous variation amongst investor protection clauses in BITs). 
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Part II: Why should the focus on democratic governance persist despite these 
difficulties? 
 
This section engages in some of the accounts from moral theory of distributive 
justice in international economic law.  The intention is to demonstrate why substantive 
arguments eventually lead back to the need for a proceduralist account of distributive 
justice.   
 
A. Rawlsian principles as applied to S&D 
 
Frank Garcia has done more than any other American legal scholar to apply 
Rawlsian theory to the international trading regime.  Garcia’s work follows the lead of 
other global justice philosophers who criticized Rawls for his reluctance to apply his 
“difference principle” to the international scale.35  Calling for an “international difference 
principle,” Garcia has argued that the S & D treatment rule can operate as “a partial 
fulfillment of the redistributive obligations that Justice as Fairness dictates for wealthier 
states in response to inequality.”36 
 
Garcia’s account illustrates all too clearly that the global economy remains deeply 
shaped by structural inequality.  Garcia could not be on stronger ground when arguing 
that any international difference principle must consider seriously the regulatory reforms 
at every level that would be required to correct this inequality.  At the same time, at least 
to my liking, Garcia has not fully addressed Rawls’ own preference for procedure over 
substance as a mechanism for distributive justice even where the difference principle 
applies, as suggested by the analysis above. 
 
In his seminal Theory of Justice, Rawls elaborated the “veil of ignorance” that 
would provide a mechanism for a just society.37  A just society would be created through 
its determining the “constitutional essentials,” many of which amounted to procedural 
fairness and what we would identify as civil and political rights. 38   
 
With respect to social and economic policy, Rawls seems to have shied away 
from a specific redistributive approach. Rather, he felt concluded that the optimal 
                                                 
35 See Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (1989), 211-272; Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World, 90 
Minnesota Law Review (2006), 1720; Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-Theory 
of Justice, 26 Cardozo Law Review (2005), 1179. 
36 Frank Garcia, Trade and Inequality, 21 Michigan Journal of International Law (2000), 976. 
37 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).  Rawls's social contract is ratified in a condition of perfect 
equality: They are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association, 
according to two basic principles.  “First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.” Rawls at 60.  Second, “Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and b) 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”  Rawls at 60.   
38 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993). 
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arrangements are still too uncertain and too unknown to maintain enough confidence to 
constitutionalize them in any form.39  Consequently, what is required for social rights is 
ongoing political dialogue as to their proper scope and application.40  A “central feature 
of this conception of distributive justice,” Rawls wrote, is that it contains a large element 
of procedural justice.”41 
 
It is certainly possible to critique this proceduralist account of distributive justice 
as simply an artifact of Rawls’s liberal political commitments.42  Yet, in the context of 
international trade, the gaps between theory and practical consequence on both sides of 
the spectrum often seem quite stark.  Trade liberalization does not always equate to 
economic growth; the experience of the East Asian countries stands as a testament to the 
possible benefits of an infant-industry approach.43  Yet an infant-industry, which would 
benefit from a non-reciprocal, preferential trade policy at the multilateral level, can also 
backfire.  In short, the benefits of a non-reciprocal or preferential trade policy may be too 
indeterminate at the abstract level, without examining particular instances. 
 
Take the example of just one developing country, Egypt, which unfortunately 
seems to have undergone trade liberalization where it would create widespread social 
harm and foregone trade liberalization where it would generate widespread social gain: 
the leveling of textile trade preferences for Egypt has dislocated massive small-scale local 
manufacturers; at the same time, a continuing protection of a domestic steel monopoly 
has forced housing costs beyond affordability.   
                                                 
39 See Rawls, Theory of Justice, at 258-292 (discussing distributive justice and political economy).   
In the context of domestic U.S. jurisprudence, the constitutional scholar Frank Michelman has 
reviewed Rawlsian justice for whether it calls for the establishment of any specific minimum entitlement.  
Michelman concludes it does not: 
 
The point for Rawls is this: A sufficient, legitimating constitutional 
agreement has to provide fully firm, strict, and reliable substantive 
guarantees of compliance with what he calls the central ranges of the 
basic negative liberties--freedoms of conscience and expression, for 
example. Regarding the rest of social citizenship, the requirement is a 
looser one. What we need, and all we need, is assurance that, whenever 
political and legislative choices bear upon the basic structural 
conditions of social citizenship, those choices will be approached by all 
who take part in them under what Rawls calls a constraint of public 
reason. 
 
Frank Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law (2003), 13.   
40 Rawls, Theory of Justice, at 304. 
41 Rawls, Theory of Justice, at 304 (emphasis added). 
42 Cf., Alisdair McIntyre, After Virtue (1981). 
43 See, e.g., Alice H. Amsden & Wan-wen Chu, Beyond Late Development: Taiwan’s Upgrading Policies 
(2003); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly 
Industrializing Countries (1995). 
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In the former case, Egypt received diffuse benefits from a principle of S & D; in 
the latter case, the same principle has worked to exacerbate domestic rents and 
corruption.  The latter scenario certainly bolsters the anti- S& D view of trade scholars 
such as Hudec, in whose view and economists.  In their view, such mechanisms create 
too many opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption, and strain the overall legitimacy 
of the system in the Global North as well as the Global South.    
 
In short, we simply don’t yet know the optimal arrangement for trade – even if the 
benefits of trade are universally recognized.  If this is true, then a dialogic model may 
remain important in the ongoing determination of optimal trade policy. 
 
 
B. Social and economic rights as a basis for ordering international economic law 
 
In Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, Carol Gould gives a sophisticated 
argument for developing a framework for the implementation of human rights and 
democratic governance on a global scale.  Gould seeks to develop a stronger basis on 
which human rights can be required by a theory of justice than would be found in other 
accounts.44  
 
Gould notes that many prevailing theories of justice, including Rawls and 
Habermas, establish a certain circularity between democracy and justice: on the one hand, 
democracy is desirable because it will lead to just outcomes, and on the other justice can 
be identified primarily because it is the result of a democratically deliberative decision-
making process.   
 
Consequently, there is no independent basis for identifying justice,45 and these 
theorists seek to address the obvious concerns about bias through stipulating ideal 
conditions for deliberation: Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” and Habermas’s “ideal speech 
                                                 
44 Carol Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights (2004), 31. 
45 Id. at 15:  
 
[S]everal theories of justice have themselves framed the principles of 
justice in terms of some consensus (e. g., Rawls, Habermas), which 
may seem to put these principles themselves in the context of a quasi-
democratic decision procedure. If that is the case, then rights entailed 
by or derived from these principles of justice might themselves 
ultimately be social constructs internal to, or constituted by, a 
democratic or quasi-democratic process and thus not independent of 
such procedures. It would not be clear, then, why the results of one 
democratic procedure would have the normative authority to constrain 
another. 
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situation.”46  By contrast, Gould argues that adopting human rights as a prior justice 
commitment would avoid this problem of circularity.47  
 
Gould must address in her own rights-based account the problems of power 
imbalances and other “differentiations” that would shadow a proceduralist account of 
justice.48  She resolves this problem by calling for a “concrete universality”  that would49 
both recognize the social relationships that both constitute and differentiate individuals, 
and that would depend on “intersociative norms emerging from … an interaction”50 of 
“peoples and cultures.”   
 
Yet this view also contains its own circularity: rights are an important precursor to 
effective democracy, but only an effective democracy can ultimately determine the most 
just definition of rights. 
 
To be sure, Gould offers an extraordinarily rich conception of deliberative 
decision-making.  By proposing a “care model of democratic community,” Gould 
introduces concepts of empathy, cooperative reciprocity and solidarity that would seem to 
provide important ballast to her proposal for a “universalizing consensus.”51  The 
ultimate point, though, remains: if we reject the possibility of deriving a meaning for 
justice, or rights, from some a priori perspective because we recognize the boundedness 
of any given vantage point, then some dialogic, deliberative, proceduralist conception of 
justice is necessary to create acceptable content for itself.  Yet this quickly brings us back 
to the “constitutional circle” that Gould recognized in her critique of earlier accounts.  
The only way out of this circularity seems to be to posit certain values that are clearly 
historically specific and therefore not favored in this consciously universalistic 
                                                 
46 Rawls and Habermas build on the moral principle of reciprocity between human beings and its 
universalization into general, abstract norms that form the basis of a just society. The “veil of ignorance” 
conceals the norm projections of individual rational actors from their particular circumstances and induces 
them to design fair political institutions. In Habermas’s “ideal speech situation”, formal procedures are 
supposed to guarantee the undistorted reciprocal expression of individual interests as well as their 
universalization into morally just norms.  See Gunther Teubner, Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or 
Transcendence Formula of Law (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society 
Association, TBA, Berlin, Germany, July 24, 2007). 
47 “But if we grant that a democratic procedure, however justified, may still arrive at an unjust outcome, 
then there must be some independent criterion of justice, the appeal to which cannot be, circularly, to a 
democratic or quasi-democratic procedure in turn.”  Gould, Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, at 
32. 
48 Id. at 61 (“Certainly, there is the important recognition that the interrelations among individuals or 
groups often have been characterized not by equality among participants but instead by one-sided relations 
of domination, superiority, or oppression”). 
49 Id. at 62 (“a conception of concrete universality that emphasizes networks of social relationships and 
engagements, where these may involve relations of domination or oppression”). 
50 Id. at 63.   
51 Id. at 45 (“It is further evident that the concept of democratic community, particularly in view of the care 
model, goes beyond the traditional and thinner notion of democracy as simply a matter of political 
representation and equal voting rights.”) 
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approach.52 
 
The indeterminacy of human rights principles thus leads to the need to point to 
some prior set of values for guiding the process of reasoning principles through to 
conclusions.  In the U.S. legal academy, those embracing an antifoundationalist liberal or 
progressive perspective have ended up stressing the need for democratic deliberation53 – 
and particularly on economic and social rights.54 
 
C. Indeterminacy, social and economic entitlements, and  S&D 
 
The ambivalence of Rawlsian theory for an international S&D framework does 
not equate to the undesirability of domestic or international socioeconomic entitlements.  
S&D, however, does not equate to social and economic entitlements.  Such entitlements 
articulate substantive benefits that accrue directly to individuals, whereas S&D identifies 
governmental practices that do not necessarily produce similar benefits. 
 
It could be argued that S & D is the closest thing to social and economic 
entitlements in the trading system: S&D would support the creation of monies (through 
increased market access for exports, tariffs or quota related price increases for imports) 
that could be used to target business development and/or poverty reduction.  However, 
there is no guarantee that those monies will be used in that fashion.  Increasing tariff 
revenues or producer profits does not ensure social and economic benefits for the larger 
population. 
 
This is not to advance the familiar argument against government 
intervention that might be found in the writing of Milton Friedman or Robert 
Hudec.55  Governments are always involved in shaping markets, and the question 
is what kind of intervention is optimal.  S&D might be optimal in some cases but 
not in others. 
 
Where the conditions exist to generate economic growth through trade, S 
& D in the form of preferential tariffs for exports, and tolerance of higher tariffs 
and trade barriers for imports, should form part of a larger tailored policy for 
growth.  In others, where the conditions exist to transform such protections into 
                                                 
52 Cf. Michael Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust,  114 Yale L.J. 1237, 1246-1250 (2005). 
53 Michael Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 875 (2003); Roberto M. 
Unger, Democracy Realized: A Progressive Alternative (2000) (concluding that an “anti-necessitarian” 
account of law calls for “democratic experimentalism.”). 
54 Frank Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political Justification, 1 Int’l J. 
Cont. L. 13 (2003).   
55 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962); Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT 
Legal System (1986). 
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classic rent-seeking that harms business development/poverty reduction, S&D 
should not be used. 
 
If the decision is between a broad, open-ended S&D framework that 
would provide sufficient policy autonomy to individual governments to make 
these tailored decisions, on the one hand, and a total denial of such autonomy on 
the other, then policy autonomy is preferable for the reasons just stated.  
Examples where policy autonomy is important include intellectual property and 
balance-of-payments restrictions.   
 
In general, though, constitutionalizing any set of substantive principles in trade 
policy would probably lead to undesirable consequences.  The argument applied above to 
caution against focusing on strengthened S&D would apply just as equally to a neoliberal 
argument for eliminating S&D altogether.   There is enough historical evidence pointing 
to the indeterminate gains from trade to question the efficacy of a simplistic free-trade 
approach in every context.  This uncertainty about the relationship between economic 
policies and social welfare is the basis for Rawls’s initial reluctance to identify “core” 
values in economic and social principles beyond the stated social goals put forward by 
the difference principle.  
 
Whereas other commentators would argue for a “constitutionalization” of free 
trade principles in the WTO, in fact the central goals of the GATT/WTO system have 
never been articulated in terms of free trade per se.  Both the GATT and the WTO 
Preambles stress that the goals of the trading regime are social welfare outcomes rather 
than particular economic policies, stating that:   
 
“relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour 
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand.”56 
 
While the particular arrangements detailed under the WTO clearly set out to 
reduce national policy space in favor of free trade, then, the restraint in endorsing free 
trade as such is important.  It means, effectively, that at the end of the day the particular 
balance between free trade and redistributive trade is still open for discussion at the 
highest level of principle. 
 
Moreover, the growing body of WTO jurisprudence will not necessitate one or 
another set of trade policy arrangements.  As the next section shows, the emergence of 
“equality jurisprudence” in the GATT/WTO has operated primarily to secure the 
                                                 
56 Preamble, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) & Preamble, Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (1994). 
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systemic viability of the Dispute Settlement Body as a legal system, rather than to resolve 
core questions about trade policy. 
 
 
Part III: “Equality jurisprudence” in the GATT/WTO 
 
In many of their efforts to advocate the adoption of S&D principles, developing-
country governments have pressed a “substantive” conceptualization of sovereign 
equality.  As Professor Lim has noted in his contribution to this conference, the Appellate 
Body appears to have embraced the concept of substantive equality that historically 
informed developing-country government mobilization efforts for reform of the 
international economic order.  In the Indian GSP case, as Lim also observed, the 
Appellate Body ruled that special conditionalities on the EC’s GSP arrangements were 
WTO-consistent as long as “similarly-situated beneficiaries” were “not treated 
differently,”57  
 
The Indian GSP case builds on a jurisprudential trend at work in a variety of 
decisions that the Appellate Body building on a substantive notion of equality.  For 
example, the Appellate Body asserted this reasoning forcefully in its Shrimp-Turtle I 
decision, holding that the purpose of the Article XX chapeau was to ensure that similarly-
situated countries (“countries where the same conditions prevail”) would be treated 
similarly.58  While Shrimp-Turtle I did not focus on S&D directly in the way that Indian 
GSP did, the concept of S&D clearly animated the question of whether the complainant 
countries in that case should be required to adopt the same relatively costly devices as 
producers elsewhere with relatively more resources at their disposal. 
 
The emergence of equality as a central concept in driving decisions is a product of 
the relative shift from a “pragmatic” trade regime in which political diplomacy was 
paramount to a “legalistic” trade regime in which some trade disputes must be decided 
through a judicial mechanism.  This shift is not complete, obviously.  However, the 
establishment of the DSB has created a forum in which claims must be articulated and 
decided in legal terms. 
 
The AB’s conscious adoption of a legalistic approach was evident in its rejection 
of the EC’s argument in the Bananas case for a more “pragmatic” interpretation of the 
provisions in question.  The EC had unsuccessfully sought to persuade the AB that the 
deal cut during the Marrakesh negotiations created a political understanding that should 
override any narrower interpretation that might be supported by a stricter attention to 
                                                 
57 Para. 69, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities – Conditions for the granting of tariff 
preferences to developing countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, 7 April 2004. 
58 Report of the Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998. 
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text.59 
 
The EC Bananas case reveals the systematization of law propelled by the WTO’s 
establishment of an adjudicatory mechanism.  A desire to maintain integrity in the WTO 
as a legal system60 requires that claims be articulated and decided in jurisprudential 
terms.  The concept of “horse-trading” represented by the reciprocity in trade 
negotiations has no real anchor in law’s understanding of itself.  Therefore, although 
reciprocity is not only non-controversial but is actually the central driver of negotiations 
among WTO Members, it is untenable as a criterion for disposing of legal claims.  Hence, 
the Bananas AB rejected the EC’s claim animated by reciprocity (“this was the deal we 
cut in Marrakesh”) in favor of an interpretation animated by the jurisprudential principle 
of equality. 
 
The emergence of “equality jurisprudence” does not constitute victory of any 
particular view of political economy or any political bloc.  Rather, it consolidates the 
transformation of WTO dispute settlement proceedings from a “power orientation” model 
to a “rule-orientation.”61   This transformation produced the establishment of the WTO 
DSB as a self-conscious – and therefore self-reproducing -- legal system.62    
 
The need to view the legal system as valid has necessitated the replacement of 
“extra-legal foundations” with legal concepts within the dispute settlement jurisprudence.  
From this perspective, it is not surprising that it is substantive equality, rather than a more 
formalistic concept of equality, that has emerged as a central concept.  Whereas a 
formalistic approach would render the process of adjudication relatively more 
technocratic, the need to parse the concept of substantive equality requires the primacy of 
jurisprudential tools and analysis.   
 
Indeed, systems theorists such as Gunther Teubner give as a prime example of 
legal autopoeisis the “equality clause” in which “reasonable criteria” must be established 
to determine the applicability.63   Consequently, the enterprise of law becomes an endless 
                                                 
59 Para. 4.104, Page 49, WT/DS27/R/ECU.  This argument was successful at the panel level, see id. at Para. 
7.110, Page 241, but was reversed at the Appellate Body level, see WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 179-188, Pages 
70-71. 
60 Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Routledge & Kegan Paul edition, Elizabeth King & 
Martin Albrow trans., 1985); Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Gunther Teubner 
ed., 1988). 
61 John Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 85 
(1994). 
62 Autopoieitic analysis of law focuses on the law’s self-referentiality and recursivity – the way in which 
legal structures are always and only justified by legal acts, and vice versa. “[T]he circular relationship 
between legal acts and legal norms . . . replaces extra-legal foundations of law.”  Teubner, Introduction to 
Autopoeitic Law, in Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988), 
at 4.   
63 Gunther Teubner, Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or Transcendence Formula of Law, at 11. 
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process of differentiation between circumstances that produce a ruling of “equal” versus 
those that produce a ruling of “unequal.”64  
 
Systems theory holds that law essentially cannot “understand” political or social 
facts as such; rather, those facts must be metabolized in the language of accepted 
jurisprudential concepts.  Thus, systems theory holds that law is normatively closed to 
claims for political or economic justice in and of themselves.  For example, arguments for 
outcomes on the basis of economic policy or political theory could not be absorbed by the 
WTO dispute settlement body in those terms. 
 
“Normatively closed” does not mean determinate or fixed.65  Because of this 
encompassing framework of reasoning through legal concepts, however, legal systems 
are not directly open to direct claims for political justice.  Such claims can only be 
addressed in terms of their articulation in jurisprudential terms.  As such, they will 
ultimately be determined not by their political objectives but by their legal framing. 
 
The Indian GSP case would seem to support a systems theory view.  Although the 
“substantive equality” model was adopted as a jurisprudential framework by the EU, that 
adoption did not correlate with a holding in favor of India.  Thus, the emergence of a 
substantive equality test hardly constitutes a clear victory for the “structuralist” agenda 
for reform of the New International Economic Order66 propounded by developing-
country governments in the 1970s when the GSP was established.  Ironically, although 
the principle of substantive equality drove the argument by developing-country 
governments for a GSP back then, in the Indian GSP case the substantive equality 
argument was adopted by the EC as respondent.   
 
In sum, a jurisprudential approach to distributive justice will remain 
indeterminate in securing specific economic gains for developing country governments.  
This means that a legislative approach is required to specify what the parameters of GSP 
should be.  Although the purveyors of GSP might argue that sovereignty allows them to 
determine these political conditionalities for themselves, the GSP is so centrally part of 
the trade regime that such indicators should be multilaterally decided. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The traditional control of the GATT/WTO by the great economic powers 
proceeded according to a consensus rule of decision-making as centrally informed by a 
dynamic of reciprocity or horse-trading in negotiations.  While this basic format for trade 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id.   
66 Raúl Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York: 
United Nations, 1950). 
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negotiations has not much altered, participation has broadened to include more 
developing-countries acting singly or, increasingly, in coalitions. 67  Thus, progress has 
been made in terms of equalizing participation by developing countries. 
 
Democratic governance in the WTO requires further reforming its negotiating and 
legislative processes to allow for broader and more meaningful inclusion of developing-
country governments.68    Ideally, democratization reforms would comprise two 
components: first, sovereign equality in state participation, e.g. one-state, one-vote; and 
second, sufficient technical assistance and capacity-building so as to make voting 
meaningful for all states.  
 
Between this ideal and contemporary reality, of course, many gradations exist.  
Short of one-state, one-vote procedural equality, greater support for government 
negotiation coalitions to assert their interests effectively in negotiations, and for a broader 
range of states to be included at earlier stages in negotiations.   
 
Over the past decade, such networks of coalitions have formed in the WTO, both 
amongst developing-country governments, and between developed and developing 
countries.  Technical assistance programs for developing country negotiators have 
become programmatized by a variety of actors including the WTO, bilateral donors, and 
non-governmental organizations.  Developing-country governments have participated 
much more extensively in negotiations. 
 
These efforts at inclusiveness have fallen far short of the mark.  Large gaps in 
capacity still exist amongst WTO Members.  Negotiations most assuredly do not reflect 
an equitable representation of the range of views amongst the membership.  Even though 
these increases in inclusiveness have been limited, however, they have still been 
associated with a freezing-up of negotiations.   
 
Like many international institutions, the perceived legitimacy of the WTO has 
been called into question by the widespread increase in the salience of globalization in 
the social consciousness.69  This increased awareness also happened to correlate with an 
actual expansion of the multilateral trade regime’s substantive and institutional power via 
the Uruguay Round, causing some to wonder whether the democratic deficit so decried in 
                                                 
67 See Mayur Patel, New Faces in the Green Room, Global Economic Governance Working Paper, at 19; 
see also infra Part. II.B. 
68 See Peter Sutherland, The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the World Trading System 
– A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 8 Journal of International Economic Law 363 (2005); see also Jeffery Atik, 
“Democratizing the WTO,” George Washington International Law Review 451 (2001) (“Symposium: 
Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium”).   
69 Arguably the change has not been as great as perceived, and certainly not for developing countries. 
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the European context might also inhibit the legitimacy of international trade law.70 
 
This paper engaged in both institutional and discursive analysis to investigate why 
that progress has been insufficient to overcome the continued breakdowns in the Doha 
talks, mining below the surface to unearth faults in the “deep structure” of the multilateral 
trading regime.  Those causes have to do not only with clear clashes of material interests 
and logistical coordination challenges directly at issue in the negotiations, but also with 
an underlying lack of trust that is revealed and reinforced by a discourse that constitutes 
state participants in the negotiations as “enemies” rather than “friends.”71  
 
What ongoing difficulties in the Doha Development Round present for democratic 
governance in the WTO?  Two methodological approaches were considered, 
“economistic” and “constructivist,” in identifying challenges to democratic governance in 
the WTO.  The   constructivist analysis pays attention to the breakdown of trust stemming 
from discursive contradictions in state identity formations both within and beyond the 
WTO.  The economistic analysis identified the multiple sources of transaction costs in 
negotiations, drawing attention to recent examples in negotiations on intellectual property 
and agricultural trade.   
 
This paper also endeavored to show why, from a normative perspective, a focus 
on democratic governance might prevail over substantive theories of distributive justice. 
Far from opening the door to nihilism, recognition of the indeterminacy of egalitarian 
principles implies the need for continued deliberation.72  For this reason, the rise of 
“equality jurisprudence” in the WTO cannot by itself answer important questions about 
the parameters of development policy in the WTO, for example in the context of applying 
the Special and Differential Treatment principle.  The parameters of those principles are 
best answered through democratic decision-making. 
 
There are several observations to be made about this argument’s relationship to 
larger debates on justice in international economic law.  First, the emphasis on 
participatory decision-making runs contrary to a very strong preference in economic law 
and policy for “expertise” -- “technocracy” over democracy, as it were.  This paper aligns 
with skeptics of “constitutionalizing” either the substantive or institutional commitments 
of the WTO.73  The welfare effects of specific configurations in trade law and policy, it is 
argued, remain sufficiently unknown as to call for “democratic experimentalism” rather 
                                                 
70 Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, 355 at 361, in Jean-Marc Coicaud & 
Veijo Heiskanen eds., The Legitimacy of International Organizations (2001); Chantal Thomas, 
Constitutional Change and International Government, 52 Hastings Law Journal 1 (2000). 
71 See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology (2005). 
72 Jürgen Habermas, Between Fact and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (William Rehg trams., 1996). 
73 For a more detailed account of literature on constitutionalizing the WTO, see Chantal Thomas, “Popular 
Constitutionalism” (2008) (manuscript on file with author). 
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than constitutionalism.74 Notably, experimentalism is called for not only with respect to 
the principle of free trade, but also to the principle of “Special and Differential 
Treatment” (hereinafter “S&D”) that is so central to trade and development analysis. 
 
Second, the state-actor focus de-emphasizes a large swath of argumentation for 
modes of democratization that transcend the traditional venue of interstate relations 
defined by formal sovereign equality.  Such alternative conceptions of democratization 
include: greater transparency and accountability by the WTO to the global public-at-
large,75 broader incorporation of civil society into the WTO,76 conditionality of a state’s 
participation in the WTO on the state’s domestic democratization,77 and the bypassing of 
the WTO altogether to form alternative institutional configurations.78   
 
While all of these approaches seem sympathetic and noteworthy, the traditional 
model of interstate democratic governance remains sufficiently out of reach in the WTO 
to constitute a worthy goal, and sufficiently conducive to reshaping WTO policies in the 
direction of egalitarian redistribution.  As a consequence, proceduralist justice in the form 
of democratic governance presents itself as the approach that may be relatively most 
attainable, and most productive, in the foreseeable future (bearing in mind Keynes’s 
gloomy but realistic warning about the “long run.”) 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 See Roberto M. Unger, Democracy Realized: A Progressive Alternative (2000), 10. 
75 Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading 
System, 96 American Journal of International Law  94 (2002); Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy 
Beyond the State, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 221 (2008). 
76 Daniel D. Bradlow, The times they are a-changing: Some preliminary thoughts on Developing Countries, 
NGOs and the Reform of the WTO, George Washington International Law Review 503 (2001)  
(Symposium: Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and 
the WTO, Harvard International Law Journal 303 (2004).  
77 Gregory Fox & Brad Roth eds., Democratic Governance and International Law (2000). 
78 Thomas Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 Philosophy and Public Affairs 195 (1994) (arguing 
for a “Global Resources Dividend” or GRD). 
